Monocentric analysis of restricting the budget share of housing alone or with transportation by Coulombel, Nicolas
Monocentric analysis of restricting the budget share of
housing alone or with transportation
Nicolas Coulombel
To cite this version:
Nicolas Coulombel. Monocentric analysis of restricting the budget share of housing alone or
with transportation. 2008. <hal-00319084>
HAL Id: hal-00319084
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00319084
Submitted on 5 Sep 2008
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
N. Coulombel 
Monocentric analysis of restricting the budget share  July 2008, Submittal to 88th TRB Meeting ‘09 
of housing alone or with transportation 
1/22 
PAPER SUBMITTED FOR 88th TRB MEETING, 2009, AND FOR 
PUBLICATION IN TRB JOURNAL  
 
 
Monocentric analysis 
 of restricting the budget share 
 of housing alone or with transportation 
 
Nicolas Coulombela 
 
a
 Université Paris-Est, Laboratoire Ville Mobilité Transport, 19 rue Alfred Nobel, Cité 
Descartes – Champs sur Marne, F-77455 Marne la Vallée Cedex 2, FRANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
Contact Information of the Corresponding Author: 
E-mail: nicolas.coulombel@enpc.fr 
Tel: (+33) 1 64 15 21 30 
Fax : (+33) 1 64 15 21 40 
 
 
 
Paper Information: 
Word Count: 5067 words + 9 Figures 
Corresponding Author: Nicolas Coulombel  
Submission Date: 2008/08/01 
N. Coulombel 
Monocentric analysis of restricting the budget share  July 2008, Submittal to 88th TRB Meeting ‘09 
of housing alone or with transportation 
2/22 
ABSTRACT 
Considering the prolonged rise of energy price and the still elevated housing prices, the policy to 
limit the share of housing expenses in the households’ budget, so as to secure their solvability, 
has been criticized. Supposedly, it induces people to get farther from the city center in search for 
cheaper housing prices, but with subsequent increased transportation costs that are often 
disregarded during the house search process. Therefore, to improve the well-being of 
households, it has been advocated to set a constraint on the share of both housing and 
transportation expenditure. 
The paper is purported to analyze and compare the effects of the two policies in terms of: 
1. Well-being of the households; 
2. Land-use: city size and density curve; 
3. Solvability of the households; 
4. Transportation costs. 
The analysis is carried out within the classical monocentric model of urban economics. After 
setting a general analysis, an applied model is specified to capture the effects of each policy in 
straightforward formulae. 
It is shown that constraining housing expenses may increase the well-being of households. 
Besides, both policies prove effective in reducing urban sprawl and hereby energy consumption. 
Thus the choice of the optimal policy will depend on the local authority’s objectives. 
 
Keywords: monocentric model, urban economics, housing expenses, transportation expenses, 
housing policy 
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INTRODUCTION  
Based on the sustained increase in the fuel price, and the still elevated housing prices, concerns 
increased about the solvability of households, especially in tight housing markets. Notably, 
because high housing prices and lack of housing supply have favored suburbanization (e.g. in the 
Paris metropolitan area), and because households living in the suburbs make the most extensive 
and expensive use of the car (1), these households are particularly sensitive to the price of 
energy.  
Consequently, the relevance of bounding the housing expenditure up to a given share of the 
household income has become controversial. In several countries the household’s housing budget 
share is capped so as to preserve its solvability. In France, this is ensured in two ways: 
• Homebuyers’ loans are based on monthly payments amounting to at most one third of the 
household’s income. 
• When applying for a dwelling, candidates for tenancy must earn at least three times the 
required rent (this ratio corresponds to widely spread practice ). 
While this policy seems to secure the solvability of households, it induces them to settle farther 
from the agglomeration center in search for affordable housing prices (2). Consequently, they 
expose themselves to significant transport costs, which jeopardize the households’ budget (see 
(3) and (4) for U.S. figures on this topic). Therefore, the use of a joint housing plus 
transportation budget share constraint is widely supported. In the U.S. several initiatives have 
been taken in this direction (5,6).  
 Although there is an abundant economic literature on the analysis of land-use regulatory 
policies (e.g. 7,8), to the best of our knowledge such is not the case for the policies we 
mentioned. Thus we propose to analyze and compare the impacts on the main features of the city 
of the policy limiting the share of the housing expenditure within the household’s budget (which 
we call the Constrained Housing Expense (CHE) policy), and of that limiting the total share of 
transportation and housing expenditures (the Constrained Housing+Transportation (CHT) 
policy). We will scrutinize the issue of the well-being of the households, the city size and the 
related transport costs, and the global level of rents. As will be seen, both policies would reduce 
urban sprawl (thus energy consumption) while maintaining or even increasing the well-being of 
the households. 
 The analysis takes place within the classical framework of urban economics, the 
monocentric model (see (9) for detailed presentation of this model). In this model households, 
with income Y, maximize their utility U(z,s) by trading-off between two goods, land (s 
representing land consumption or lot size), and a composite good denoted by z standing for all 
other goods, under a budget constraint. This is summed up in the following program: 
YrTzsrRtsszUMax
rsz
=++ )()(..),(
,,
 
While R(r) stands for the relative land rent, the z good is taken as the numéraire, and T(r) 
represent transport costs. Variable r represents location: since locating farther from the central 
business district (CBD) implies higher transport costs, households typically trade-off between 
accessibility and housing prices when choosing their location. Note that in the simplified context 
of the monocentric model, land rents and housing prices are equivalent. 
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 The plan is as follows: the first section being the present introduction, the second section 
analyzes the CHE policy while the third section scrutinizes the CHT policy. Section Four offers a 
comparative analysis of the two measures and policy recommendations. 
 Throughout the paper the theoretical properties are asserted in explicit statements; 
however, for the sake of brevity most of the proofs have been omitted (if so a mention “proof 
omitted” is introduced). Demonstrations are gracefully available on request to the author. 
 
CAPPING THE HOUSING BUDGET SHARE 
In this section we analyze the impacts brought about by the CHE policy in terms of: 
• Household utility 
• Land use: city size, density 
• Composition of the household budget 
To do so, we first present the constrained housing expenses (CHE) model and solve the 
household program. Then we characterize the equilibrium city and proceed to comparative 
statics in the general case. Lastly, we study in detail the different impacts of the CHE policy in 
the case of a linear city. 
 
The Constrained Housing Expense (CHE) model 
Let us consider the general case, where U(z,s) and T(r) are only assumed to comply with the 
classical hypotheses : 
• U(z,s) is concave, strictly increasing with z and s, and is well-behaved (according to the 
definition provided in Fujita (9)).  
• T(r) increases with distance r to the CBD. 
 
Presentation of the CHE model 
In order to study the CHE policy, we amend the monocentric model with the following 
constraint: 
YsrR α≤)(
             (E1) 
Housing expenditure R(r)s is capped to a fraction α of the household’s income Y. Given the 
budget constraint of the household, (E1) is equivalent to the following constraint, which will 
prove easier to handle: 
)()1( rTYz −−≥ α             (E2) 
Consequently, the household program becomes: 



−−≥
=++
)()1(
)()(
..),(max
,, rTYz
YrTsrRz
tsszU
rsz α
           (E3) 
Note that α≥1 yields the original unconstrained model.  
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Notations 
We use the following notations: 
• A tilde superscript (~) for the CHE model, no symbol for the original model 
• We often omit the argument α when unnecessary.  
• { })()1(),(/),( rTYurzruEA −−<= αα  is the strictly binding zone, defined as the set of 
locations r where the Lagrange multiplier associated to (E2) is strictly positive. 
• S(z,u) is the inverse function of U(z,s) with respect to s. 
• rmax is the farthest feasible location: YrT =)( max . 
 
The bid-max program 
 
Bid rent function of the household   Bid rent functions for the CHE and original models are 
defined as usual: 






=
−−
=Ψ






−−≥
=
−−
=Ψ
uszU
s
zrTY
ur
rTYz
uszU
s
zrTY
ur
sz
sz
),()(max),(
)()1(
),()(
max),(~
,
, α
           (E4) 
Argmax of the unconstrained program are denoted s(r,u) and z(r,u). Let us recall classical 
properties: 
• s(r,u) increases with r and u  
• Ψ(r,u) decreases with r and u 
• z(r,u) decreases with r  
Because ),(~ urΨ  is obtained by adding the HE constraint to the original program, we have the 
following property (proof omitted): 
PROPERTY 1 
[ ]
( )[ ]
[ ]



Ψ=Ψ
−−=
−−=
),(~/),,(min),(~
),()1(),,(min),(~
)()1(),,(max),(~
ursYurur
urTYSursurs
rTYurzurz
α
α
α
                      (E5) 
which implies that ),( ur∀ , ),(),(~ urzurz ≥ , ),(),(~ ursurs ≤  and ),(),(~ urur Ψ≤Ψ  
To sum up, for a given utility level, and inside the binding zone, capping housing expenditures 
reduces: 
• the lot size which is bid for. 
• the ability to pay for a unit of land. 
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Properties of the bid-max variables   A binding HE constraint alters the solutions. 
Nevertheless, system (E5) ensures that: 
• ),(~ urs  increases with r, u and α 
• ),(~ urΨ  decreases with r, u and increases with α 
• ),(~ urz  decreases with r and α 
Conservation of the properties with respect to r and u is central to demonstrating the existence 
and uniqueness of the equilibrium land use. Regarding the role of α, relieving the constraint 
increases the maximum level of housing expenditures, which allows households to purchase 
bigger lots, increase their bid rent, and reduce their consumption of the z good. 
 
The case of single household type 
We investigate in this subsection the standard framework of a closed city with absentee landlords 
and inhabited by households of a given single type, with income Y and utility function U(z,s). 
After demonstrating the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the CHE model, we 
perform comparative statics in order to compare the CHE equilibrium to the original equilibrium.  
 As usual, we note N the number of households and we assume positive land supply 
L(r)>0 at all r>0. 
 
Existence and uniqueness of the CHE equilibrium 
As in Fujita (9) for the unconstrained model, demonstration of the existence and uniqueness of 
the equilibrium in the CHE model is equivalent to proving that there exists a unique couple 
)~,~( fru  that complies with the following system: 





=
=Ψ
∫
fr
Af
Ndr
urs
rL
Rur
~
0 )~,(~
)(
)~,~(~
                (E6) 
The first equality is the boundary condition that determines the edge fr~ of the city: at fr~  bid rent 
equates the opportunity cost of land, RA. The second equality corresponds to the population 
constraint: integration of the density function within the city gives N, the total number of 
households. Note that density n(r) is given by the available land supply divided by the land 
consumption per household, i.e. ( ) ( ) ( )ursrLrn ~,~÷=  
PROPOSITION 1 
The CHE monocentric model with single household type admits a unique equilibrium.  
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 
Similarly to Fujita (9), we consider the outer boundary function )(~ ub  characterized by 
∫ =
)(~
0 ),(~
)(ub Ndr
urs
rL
. )(~ ub  determines the city size for a given target utility u. Since ),(~ urs  
exhibits the same required features as s(r,u), that is to say ),(~ urs  is decreasing in u, tends 
toward +∞ when +∞→u  and tends toward 0 when −∞→u , we could proceed 
similarly to Fujita to show that )(~ ub  is well-defined on an interval ]-∞,a[, where possibly  
a=+∞. Besides, ( )ub~  strictly increases with u and ranges from 0 to +∞ when u ranges from -
∞ to a.  
Then we consider ))(~,(~)(~ xUxxRBound Ψ=  where )(
~)(~ 1 xbxU −=  for x∈[0,rmax[. ( )xRBound~  
is the land rent at the edge x of a city, the utility of which has been chosen so as to procure 
the required size x. Since )(~ ub  increases strictly with u, )(~ xU  also increases strictly with x, 
implying that ( )xRBound~  is strictly decreasing in x (remember that ),(~ urΨ  is decreasing in 
both r and u). Since 0)(~ max =rRBound  and ∞+→
→0
)(~
x
Bound xR , the equation ABound RxR =)(
~
 
admits one and only one solution  fr~ . Eventually, by taking )~(~~ frUu = , it is trivial to check 
that )~,~( fru  satisfies system (E6). 
 
 
Comparative statics in the general case 
We determine here the influence of the constraint parameter α on the equilibrium city.  
 
City Size   Quite intuitively, the CHE policy reduces the city size: 
PROPOSITION 2 
For any set (N,Y,RA) the size ( )αfr~  of the CHE city increases with α 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 
Let us first show that the constrained boundary rent curve ( )1,~ αxRBound  is below the 
second one, i.e.: ( ) ( )21 ,~,~ αα xRxR BoundBound ≤  
As ),,(~),,(~),,( 21 αα ursursur ≤∀  then ∫∫ ≥
xx
dr
urs
rLdr
urs
rL
0 20 1 ),,(~
)(
),,(~
)(
αα
.  
Since ∫ ∫ ==
),(~
0
),(~
0 21
1 2
),,(~
)(
),,(~
)(α α
αα
ub ub
Ndr
urs
rLdr
urs
rL
, this implies ( ) ( )21 ,~,~ αα ubub ≤ , 
which in turn implies that the inverse functions are in reversed order, that is to say 
( ) ( )21 ,~,~ αα xUxU ≥ .  
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Using the inequality ),,(~),,(~),,( 21 αα ururur Ψ≤Ψ∀ , we have: 
( ) ( ) ),,~,(~),,~,(~)),,(~,(~ 221211 αααααα xUxxUxxUx Ψ≤Ψ≤Ψ   
( ) ( )21 ,~,~ αα xRxR BoundBound ≤⇒  
which is the claimed property. Considering this, demonstration of proposition 2 is 
straightforward since AfBoundfBound RrRrR == )),(~(
~)),(~(~ 2211 αααα . 
Because α≥1 yields the original model, proposition 2 unveils that the CHE city is smaller than 
the original one. 
 
Equilibrium utility   While the analysis of equilibrium utility is more complex, the following 
proposition gives an insight: 
PROPOSITION 3 
For any couple α1<α2, if the household located at the edge of the α2 city spends less than α1Y 
on housing (i.e. ( )122 ),(~)(~ ααα uEr Af ∉ ), then the equilibrium utility )(~ 1αu  of the α1 city 
is superior to the equilibrium utility )(~ 2αu  of the α2 city. 
PROOF 
For a household located at ( )2~ αfr , we have the following relations: 
- )),(~),(~(~)),(~),(~(~ 222122 αααααα urur ff Ψ=Ψ   from ( )122 ),(~)(~ ααα uEr Af ∈  
- ( ) ( )222111 ),(~),(~~),(~),(~~ αααααα urRur fAf Ψ==Ψ    (boundary conditions) 
- ( ) ( )111112 ),(~),(~~),(~),(~~ αααααα urur ff Ψ≤Ψ  due to )(~)(~ 21 αα ff rr ≤   (proposition 2) 
By combining these relations, we have ( ) ( )122112 ),(~),(~~),(~),(~~ αααααα urur ff Ψ≤Ψ , which 
implies )(~)(~ 21 αα uu ≥ . 
Proposition 3 shows specific conditions under which the equilibrium utility of the CHE city 
decreases with α. By choosing α2=1, it gives a simple condition, sufficient but not necessary, for 
the CHE city to display a higher equilibrium utility than the unconstrained city (with equilibrium 
utility ueq). On the other hand, we will see in the application to come that the case equu <)(~ α  is 
possible when the constraint puts an excessive burden on the households.  
 Actually, the HE constraint induces two effects that alter the equilibrium utility level: 
• Being constrained in their choices, households achieve a lower utility at a given location 
and land rent price 
• But capping housing expenses has a depressing effect on bid prices, hence on land rents, 
which tends to increase the utility of the households 
Depending on the relative magnitude of these two effects, the resulting utility level of the HE 
city is higher or lower than that of the original city. 
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Housing expenses   Determining the influence of α on housing expenses proves not trivial, 
because tightening the HE constraint may result in a lower utility level, which in turn may 
increase the housing expenses of unconstrained households. Nonetheless, when the equilibrium 
utility rises, it is possible to show that tightening the constraint always diminishes the total land 
rent distributed to the landlords. The same goes when the constraint is binding for the whole city. 
 
Application to a linear city 
Considering the limitations of the general case analysis, we now provide a special case as an 
illustration, with a log-linear utility function szszU log2/1log2/1),( += , linear transport 
costs T(r)=ar and a linear city: L(r)=1. We did not choose a disk-shaped city (i.e. L(r)=2pir) since 
calculations prove more complex, especially for deriving analytical results. 
 
Derivation of the equilibrium city 
After determining the binding zone, we derive the different variables of interest, that is to say 
bid-max variables, utility level and city size, which we use in the next subsection to analyze the 
equilibrium outcomes. 
 
Determination of the binding zone   The log-linear form utility function implying that 
)(2/1),( arYurz −= , the housing expenditure constraint is strictly binding when: 
a
Y
rr bind
)21()( αα −=<            (E7) 
Thus: 
• if 2/1≥α  the HE constraint is never binding, the CHE model is equivalent to the 
unconstrained model. 
• if 2/1<α , only households located closer than rbind(α) are effectively submitted to the 
HE constraint. 
 
Characterization of the equilibrium   Resolution of the bid-max program brings about the 
following formulae: 
{ }



−−=Ψ
=
−−=
≤
− arYYeur
urzeurs
arYurz
rr
u
u
bind
)1(),(~
),(~/),(~
)1(),(~
)(
2
2
αα
α
α     





−=Ψ
=
−=
≥
− 4/)(),(~
),(~/),(~
2/)(),(~
)(
22
2
arYeur
urzeurs
arYurz
rr
u
u
bind α        (E8) 
Figure 1 illustrates these solutions for the following settings (which will constitute our reference 
model): N=10, Y=80, a=8 and RA=20. In addition to that we choose α=0.20 and u=21.21 (which 
corresponds to the equilibrium utility of the CHE model for the chosen settings). For these 
settings rmax=10 and rbind=6. 
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FIGURE 1a   Lot size and z good consumption in the Unconstrained (U) and CHE models. 
 
FIGURE 1b   Bid rent functions. 
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As previously observed, for a given utility the HE constraint reduces both the lot size and the bid 
rent inside the binding zone, and increases the consumption of the composite good. Outside the 
binding zone, we find the same solutions for the CHE and unconstrained models. 
 We are now ready to characterize the equilibriums. 
PROPOSITION 4 
In the applied case, the equilibrium is characterized as follows: 
 crαα ≤  [ ]2/1,crαα ∈  2/1≥α  
ue
~2
 







−




 −
+ aNRNa
R
Y
A
A
2
2
22
2
22 1
α
αα
 
( )
( )ARaN
Y
+
+−
2
221 22 αα
 ( )ARaN
Y
+4
2
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1
211
−








++=
A
cr R
aN
α  
Calculations are based on the distinction of 3 cases: 
• α≥1/2 yields the unconstrained model 
• If α∈[αcr,1/2], the city fringe is beyond rbind(α) 
• If α≤αcr, the HE constraint  is active for the whole city  
 
Comparative statics for the applied model 
Thanks to the computation of the different equilibriums, we can proceed to a more precise 
analysis of the role of α.  
 
Utility level   In the applied model, while an appropriate choice of α increases the households’ 
utility compared to the unconstrained city, setting α to too low a value usually decreases it. 
PROPERTY 2 
For any given set of parameters (N,Y,RA>0,a), the equilibrium utility )(~ αu  of the CHE city 
strictly decreases on [αcr,1/2] with equu =)2/1(~ . It is maximal for αmax<αcr, with 
equu >)(~ maxα . Furthermore,  ∞−→
→0
)(~
α
αu  
If RA=0, )(~ αu  strictly decreases on ]0,1/2] and therefore is maximal when α tends toward 0. 
Demonstration (proof omitted) is carried out by using proposition 4.  
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Figure 2 depicts the variations of )(
~2 αue
 for our reference model (corresponding to N=10, Y=80, 
a=8 and RA=20); for these settings αcr=0.25. 
 
FIGURE 2  Utility level and city size of the CHE city. 
We can check that 0.176=αmax<αcr =0.25, which corroborates property 2. 
 Property 2 confirms proposition 3: whenever the city fringe is beyond the binding zone 
(i.e. ( ) ( )αα bindf rr ≥~  which is equivalent to α≥αcr ), the CHE city displays a higher utility level 
than the unconstrained city. On the other hand, if the city is entirely constrained, reducing α 
proves worthwhile at first but quickly utility dwindles.  
 As a matter of fact, when the outside competition (the agricultural sector) for land is 
mild, the constraints put on households’ choices are more than compensated by the drop of prices 
that results from a less fierce competition for land within the binding zone. This increases the 
utility of all households. Conversely, if competitiveness of the households is too weakened 
compared to the agricultural sector, reduction of the city size is exacerbated and leads to 
declining utility.  
 
City Size and Density   Contrary to the utility level, tightening the housing budget constraint 
always curtails the city (see proposition 2) as shown on Figure 2. When α is decreased from 0.5 
to 0, city size shrinks, and this phenomenon is accentuated when α<αmax, i.e. when the HE 
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constraint becomes too pregnant relatively to the need to compete for land with the agricultural 
sector. 
 Reduction of the city size is achieved in different ways according to the value of α: 
• When the utility level increases, owing to higher densities near the CBD that overweigh 
lower densities in the suburban area  
• When the utility level decreases, density uniformly rises throughout the city 
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium densities for the original city, and two CHE cities with α=0.3 
and α=0.15: 
 
FIGURE 3  Influence of α on density in the reference model. 
When α is chosen within [αmax,1/2], we observe as predicted higher densities near the CBD, but 
lower densities in the suburbs. When α is chosen within [0,αmax], density rises throughout the 
whole town.  
 
Average composition of the households’ budgets   Since the HE policy was designed to cap 
housing expenses so as to ensure the solvability of the households, one key issue pertains to the 
average composition of the household’s budget at the equilibrium land use (proof omitted): 
PROPERTY 3 
For any given set (N,Y,RA,a), both the housing and transportation average expenditures are 
rising with α, inducing a declining consumption of the z good 
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Figure 4 exemplifies Property 3 for the reference model. For high values of α (between 0.4 and 
0.5), decreasing α only slightly reduces the housing and transportation budget shares, because a 
limited number of households is affected by the constraint. If α further decreases (approximately 
until αmax=0.176), housing expenses decrease more sharply while transport costs are moderately 
affected. On this interval, decreasing α has a more significant depressing effect on prices than on 
lot sizes. Below αmax, the constraint weighs more on the households’ choices of lot size, resulting 
in the fall of the city size and lower transportation and housing expenditures. 
 
FIGURE 4  Influence of α on the average composition of the household's budget. 
 
Concluding remarks for the CHE model   To sum up, capping housing expenditures has the 
twofold effect of distorting households’ residential choices (regarding lot size), and reducing 
equilibrium prices of the housing market. At first, the latter effect overweighs the former, leading 
to an increase in the utility level while the global structure of the city (size, use of transportation) 
is relatively unchanged. Nevertheless decreasing α further eventually tightens drastically the lot 
sizes, resulting in both dropping utility level and city size. 
 Of course, the utility rise generated by ad hoc values of α has a cost: the total housing 
expenses distributed to landlords (more precisely, the adequate notion would be the total 
differential land rent presented in (9) but for simplicity of the argument we keep with total 
housing expenses). By enforcing reduced prices, the CHE policy proceeds to a form of 
redistribution from the landlords to the households similar to the public ownership case 
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described in Fujita (9), where rents are redistributed to the households. This redistribution is at 
the origin of the higher utility than in the unconstrained city with absentee landlords.  
 Given the analysis of the Herbert-Stevens model (9), we know that utility of the closed-
city model is maximized in the case of public ownership. No other configuration of the city, and 
in particular the CHE city, can outperform this one in utility grounds. Yet, the CHE policy is 
widely enforced and accepted, while such is not the case for the public ownership of land. Thus 
it constitutes an interesting policy that can improve the solvability of the households and make 
them better off at the same time, though being detrimental to landlords. 
 
 
CONSTRAINT ON THE BUDGET SHARE OF BOTH HOUSING AND 
TRANSPORTATION  
Let us now turn our attention to an alternative policy, consisting in capping the share of housing 
and transportation expenditures. As previously, we scrutinize the impacts of such a policy on the 
equilibrium city, in particular the influence of the constraint parameter µ . 
 Considering the similarities borne by the CHT and CHE policies, we first present the 
main results, omitting the proofs, and then focus on the application to the linear city.  
 
The Constrained Housing+Transportation (CHT) model 
 
Overview of the CHT model 
The CHT model is a monocentric model amended with the following constraint: 
     YrTsrR µ≤+ )()(             (E9) 
The sum of housing and transportation expenditures is capped to a fraction µ  of the household’s 
income Y. The case µ≥1 is consequently tantamount to the classic unconstrained model. 
Enforcement of such a policy exerts the same effects as the CHE policy: 
• curtailing lot size choices of the households (actually it sets de facto a minimal density) 
• narrowing down prices 
Yet this time it can be shown that the constraint concerns above all the households in the 
suburban area (starting from the edge of the city). The tighter it becomes, the more households it 
affects until covering the whole city. 
 
Equilibrium features in the general case 
The CHT land use equilibrium exists and is unique. The only specific property of the equilibrium 
in the general case is that city size increases with µ, which is the result of the minimal density 
enforcement. The HT constraint induces the two same economic forces that influence the 
equilibrium utility level: 
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• By dragooning the households to make sub-optimal choices, the latter achieve a lower 
utility level 
• But capping HT expenses generates a “discount” on housing prices, which makes the 
households better-off  
Nevertheless, contrary to the HE policy, there is no obvious case where we can predict the 
outcome. The same goes for housing expenses. 
 
Application to a linear city 
So as to compare the CHE and CHT policies, let us come back to the application that features: 
szszU log2/1log2/1),( += , arrT =)(  and 1)( =rL . 
 
Derivation of the equilibrium city 
 
Determination of the binding zone   The HT constraint is strictly binding when: 
a
Y
rr bind
)12()( −=> µµ             (E10) 
Hence the following cases: 
• If µ<1/2 the HT constraint is always binding. 
• If µ≥1/2, households located beyond rbind(µ) are bound by the HT constraint.  
 
Characterization of the equilibrium   Resolution of the bid-max program brings about the 
following system of equations: 
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Figure 5 illustrates (E11) for the settings of the reference model (N=10, Y=80, a=8, RA=20). 
Moreover we choose µ=0.70 and u=16 (corresponding to the equilibrium utility of the CHT 
reference model for the selected value of µ), which yields rmax=7 and rbind=4. 
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FIGURE 5  Bid Rent, Surfaces and z Good Consumptions in the Unconstrained (U) and CHT models. 
As previously stated, for r≤rbind the HT constraint is ineffective, leading to the same solution that 
in the original case. For r≥rbind, the constraint becomes active, leading to constant choices of 
surface and of the z good. 
 From (E11), we can derive the equilibrium utility and city size of the CHT city: 
PROPOSITION 5 
In the applied case, the equilibrium is characterized as follows: 
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where 
A
A
cr RaN
R
+
−=
2
11µ  
Calculations are based on the distinction of 3 cases: 
• µ≥µcr yields the unconstrained model 
• If µ∈[1/2,µcr], rbind(µ)≥0, thus households living in the central area of the city are 
unconstrained 
• If µ≤1/2, rbind(µ)≤0. The HT constraint is active for the whole city. 
 
Comparative statics for the applied model 
 
Utility level   Starting from µ=1, while decreasing µ  has no impact at first on the utility level of 
the households (compared to the unconstrained city), for µ≤1/2 it decreases the utility level. 
PROPERTY 4 
For any given set of parameters (N,Y,RA,a), the equilibrium utility )(ˆ µu  of the CHT city 
strictly increases with µ  on [0,1/2] and is constant for µ≥1/2. 
Considering Proposition 5, Property 4 is straightforward. Yet, this property proves enlightening 
for it states that, for µ∈[1/2,µcr], the “discount” given to the households on housing prices is 
perfectly compensated by the capped lot sizes.  If µ≤1/2, the constraint becomes too strong, 
inducing a drop in the utility level. 
 Figure 6 depicts the variations of )(ˆ2 µue  for the reference model, where µcr=0.776: 
 
FIGURE 6  Utility level and city size of the CHT city. 
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City Size and Density   As previously stated for any given set of parameters (N,Y,RA,a), the city 
size increases with µ , which is illustrated for our reference model in Figure 6. On [1/2,µcr] the 
city size is fairly well approximated by a linear function, which underlines the efficiency of this 
policy in reducing the city size (relatively to the CHE policy). 
 Similarly to the CHE policy, the CHT policy alters the spatial distribution of density, but 
this time it sets a minimum density level that affects either the most remote part of the city 
(µ∈[1/2, µcr]), or the whole city (µ≤1/2). This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 7: 
 
FIGURE 7  Influence of µ on equilibrium density in the reference model. 
 
Average composition of the households’ budgets   Similarly to the HE policy, the HT policy 
brings about lower housing and transportation expenditures from the households, as illustrated in 
Figure 8 (proof of following property omitted): 
PROPERTY 5 
For any given set (N,Y,RA,a), both the housing and transport average expenditures are rising 
with µ , while the average consumption of the composite good decreases with µ . 
When the HT policy becomes active (starting from µcr), increasing the constraint results in 
decreasing transport costs and housing expenses. Contrary to the HE policy, the two items 
decrease simultaneously in similar proportions, which is indeed the result of capping housing and 
transportation expenses in place of solely housing expenditures. When µ  gets lower than 1/2, the 
decrease steepens. 
 
N. Coulombel 
Monocentric analysis of restricting the budget share  July 2008, Submittal to 88th TRB Meeting ‘09 
of housing alone or with transportation 
20/22 
 
FIGURE 8  Influence of µ on the average composition of the household's budget. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
To sum up, let us compare the main results about the linear city under the CHE and CHT 
policies. This is achieved by displaying the resulting equilibrium utility level and city size of the 
reference applied model for a target solvability level, defined as the fraction of income remaining 
after paying the housing and transportation costs (Figure 9). 
 In both models, increasing the solvability of households is done by tightening the 
corresponding constraint, until reaching the maximal solvability level of 100% for a value of the 
constraint parameter equal to zero. Since a constraint parameter of one yields the unconstrained 
model in both cases, each pair of curves starts at the same point. 
 Figure 9 unveils that the CHE policy provides a greater utility for any target level of 
solvability, but at the cost of a greater city size. As regards land use, while both policies induce 
shrinkage of the city, the CHE policy steepens the density curve when the utility rises, while the 
CHT policy always flattens the density curve. Moreover, the CHT policy is more efficient as 
regards reducing the city size, and equivalently transportation costs and energy consumption. 
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FIGURE 9  Comparison of the utility levels and the city sizes according to the solvability level 
Consequently, our linear model suggests that while the CHE policy is beneficial to the 
households on utility grounds, and does improve their solvability while reducing city size and 
transport expenses at the same time, the CHT policy makes a better tool to struggle against urban 
sprawl and transportation costs. Because our model includes neither several externalities such as 
pollution or congestion, nor the scarcity of energy, the CHT policy might prove a better choice 
than the CHE policy, despite utility considerations, depending on the objectives of the local 
authorities. In all cases, both policies can be used to secure a target level of solvability for the 
households. 
 While our model was helpful in understanding the CHE and CHT policies, several 
improvements are planned so as to assess the policy effects in more realistic settings: 
• Considering the case of a disk-shaped city, which will complicate the calculations. 
• Calibrating the utility functions and the parameters on existing metropolitan areas. 
• Considering the policy impacts in terms of car ownership decision and modal choice, 
especially for the CHT policy. 
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